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NOTES
OMISSION AND NONDISCLOSURE UNDER
SEC RULE 10b-5: A DISTINCTION IN SEARCH
OF A DIFFERENCE
I. Introduction
Ever since a private cause of action was implied' under -section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder,3 courts have grappled with defining its
1. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), is credited with first
implying a private cause of action. That a private cause of action exists is now "well estab-
lished." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). But see Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (if remedy exists under section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 it is an exclusive remedy); accord, Pearlstein v. Justice Mortgage In-
vestors, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,760 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 1978); Kulchok v.
Government Employees Ins. Co., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. 96,002
(D.D.C. 1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). The pertinent part of the statute reads:
Manipulative and deceptive devices
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national security exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device, or contrivance in contavention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
There is little legislative history of section 10(b), but see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976), and reports cited therein.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). The Rule provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
exchange.
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
For the "legislative" history of the Rule see Freeman, Conference on Codification of Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
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elements. Because the Rule itself speaks in terms of fraud,4 the
common-law actions of fraud and misrepresentation have been
looked to for guidance.'
This Note begins with one of those elements: causation Causa-
tion, in a common law action for misrepresentation, is typically
shown by reliance;7 that is, by the plaintiff demonstrating that he
relied upon the act of the defendant and was thereby harmed. In the
context of Rule 10b-5, causation can be shown in terms of reliance,
however an alternate theory has developed. In certain circumstan-
ces proof of materiality has substituted for reliance. This Note will
show that, while there is disagreement among the circuits,' causa-
tion is properly shown by materiality only if the fraud occurred
because of the total nondisclosure, rather than the omission, of a
material fact. Nondisclosure and omission shall be defined and dis-
tinguished' and various courts' discussions thereof examined.,"
II. The Language of the Rule
Rule 10b-5 is divided into three clauses. Clause one prohibits the
employment of any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." The
second clause is bifurcated. The first part is addressed to the mak-
ing of untrue statements," so-called "misstatements." The second
part deals with omissions, making it unlawful to "omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
. . .. Clause three, similar to clause one, is a broad prohibition
of any act or practice which operates or would operate as a fraud or
The three clauses, (a), (b), and (c) are often called "(1), (2), and (3)." This Note will
perpetuate the misnomers.
4. See clause one and three of the Rule note 3 supra.
5. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975); Hold-
sworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693-95 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); List
v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
6. In tort law this has been called, with minor variations, "cause in fact," W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ov THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] or "legal
cause" 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A (1977).
7. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 110, at 732; 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977).
8. See pt. V infra.
9. See pt. III infra.
10. See pt. V infra.
11. See note 3 supra.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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deceit.' 4 Additionally, clause three contains the "in connection
with" requirement of a purchase or sale.' 5
Clause two is specifically addressed to omission and provides a
rudimentary definition: an omission is the withholding of informa-
tion in the context of statements already made. However, neither
the Rule not its underlying statute are directly addressed to the
situation of total nondisclosure. Although most courts overlook the
fact that the Rule is so divided, those that do not, hold that either
clause one or three is broad enough to include nondisclosure."
III. Omission and Nondisclosure Defined
Although the distinction between the clauses of the Rule itself
indicates that omission is not the same as nondisclosure, more pre-
cise definitions are necessary.
A. Omission Defined
Properly, an omission is a deficiency. This follows not only from
the language of the second clause of the Rule, but logically as well:
something can be omitted only if something else has already been
said. 7 Generally, omissions can be of two types: those that cause a
related statement," which has already been made, to become mis-
leading; and those that are unrelated to a previous statement but
are left out of a writing or other communication and tend to make
the entire communication misleading.
It is well settled that material misstatements or omissions in a
company's annual report will give rise to liability under the Rule."
Therefore, as an example of the first type of omission, were a com-
pany to state in its annual report that the company had entered into
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). "The fact
that defendants did not make any statements at all does not, in and of itself, deprive plain-
tiff of relief. The three subsections of Rule 10b-5 are in the disjunctive, and while subsection
(2) seems to require a statement of some sort, subjections (1) and (3) do not." Id. at 243. See
also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); 1 A. BROMBERG,
SECURmEs LAW: FRAUD § 2.6(2) at 51 (1975 ed.) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]; 3 L. Loss,
SECURmEs REGULATION 1439 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
17. 1 BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 2.6(2), at 51.
,
18. By "related statement" is meant a statement having to do with the same subject or
transaction.
19. See, e.g., Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1231 n.27 (D. Del.) (citing Heit v. Weitzen,
402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969)), aff'd, 453 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1971).
19791
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a lucrative contract, without stating that one of the parties to the
contract was in breach and performance was doubtful, it would be
an omission. 0 While the company's statement that a favorable con-
tract was entered into is literally true, it is misleading without the
qualification.
As an example of the second type, if in the litigation portion of a
company's annual report to the SEC a legal judgment" against the
company was not included, this too would be an omission. Note here
that the judgments (or pending actions) which are reported are just
as true without the omitted statement.
What makes both of these examples of withholdings omissions is
the context in which they appear. The lack of information tends to
make the entire document less accurate, or less true; hence the
appellation "half-truths." 2 Analytically, an omission can be seen
simply as the other side of a misrepresentation. 23 Thus, a failure to
include an expense item in an income statement could be consid-
ered either a misrepresentation of income or the omission of an
expense item.24
B. Nondisclosure Defined
Nondisclosures is the total lack of a statement when there is an
affirmative duty to speak.2 The easiest example is an insider trad-
ing case. Under case law, a person who comes into possession of
inside information pertaining to a stock is under a duty to either
make the information public or abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the stock.27 Therefore, a broker Who has such information,2
20. This fact pattern is suggested by Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.
1975). Under the circumstances of Chelsea, however, the withholding was treated as a non-
disclosure. Id. at 1269-70.
21. It is assumed that the judgment was material.
22. See clause 2 of the Rule at note 3 supra.
23. 3 Loss, supra note 16, at 1434.
24. Little v. First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302, 1304 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976). "The catagories of
'omission' and 'misrepresentation' are not mutually exclusive." Id.
25. A nondisclosure has also been called a "pure omission." Note, The Nature and Scope
of Reliance in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lob-5, 24 CASE WEST. L. REv. 363, 379-80
(1973).
26. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972).
27. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
28. The analysis would be the same if it were the client with the inside information. See,
e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming imposition of criminal
penalties for trading on inside information), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3740 (U.S. May 15,
[Vol. VII
NOTES
yet remains silent when a client asks him to trade in the stock,
"commits" a nondisclosure upon execution of the trade."9 Such fact
patterns fit into a general paradigm of duty to speak coupled with
total silence.' °
A nondisclosure, therefore, is identifiable only if the circum-
stances surrounding the withholding of the information are exam-
ined.3 ' For instance, a nondisclosure will rarely, if ever,' occur in a
transaction in which a writing is involved. In such a situation a
withholding would be treated as an omission, for it would be the
withholding of information under circumstances which would cause
other statements in the writing, or the entire writing, to become
misleading. Therefore, the talisman for nondisclosure, is the duty
to disclose.
IV. The Duty to Disclose
At early common law an action for misrepresentation would not
lie for nondisclosure, because the law did not recognize liability for
nonfeasance. 3' This harsh rule was mitigated by allowing an action
if there existed a fiduciary, or other special relationship, between
the plaintiff and the defendantA Allowing the cause of action is only
the beginning, however, for there remains a problem of proof. The
plaintiff must still overcome the difficulty of demonstrating the
casual nexus between defendant's nondisclosure, a "non-act," and
1979) (No. 78-1202). The result would be different at common law. There, a buyer may use
special knowledge without incurring liability. See PeosSER, supra note 6, § 106, at 698.
29. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner.& Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240
(2d Cir. 1974).
30. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). In Capital Gains
an action was brought pursuant to the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
et seq. (1976), for "scalping." Scalping is a practice whereby a broker purchases stock for his
own account prior to recommending the stock to clients. After the clients buy, the stock's
price rises and the broker sells his own shares at a profit. Naturally the practice is not
disclosed to clients. Capital Gains has been cited approvingly by the Court as an example of
nondisclosure. Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.14 (1977).
31. This is developed in pt. IV infra.
32. It is theoretically possible to have a nondisclosure in a transaction in which a writing
is involved. If a purchaser in possession of inside information were to send a letter offering to
buy shares at $X, an unfairly low price, it might be a nondisclosure. Even here, however, the
argument could be made that the letter contains a misrepresentation. It could be argued that
an offer to buy at a certain price implies that it is a fair price.
33. See pt. III(A) supra.
34. PRossEa, supra note 6, § 106, at 696.
35. Id.
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the harm suffered. Both problems were solved, in the Rule 10b-5
context, by the Supreme Court in 1972.11
A. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
In Affiliated Ute two bank officials perpetrated a fraud on a group
of mixed-blood Indians. 7 Pursuant to the Ute Partition Act,' the
Ute Indians divided, inter alia, oil and mineral rights in their reser-
vation, and shares therein were distributed." A bank near the resi-
dences of many of the mixed-blood Indians acted as transfer agent
for the shares.9 Two of the bank's officials induced some of the
mixed-blood Indians to sell their shares. The mixed-blood Indians
brought suit in federal district court against, inter alia, the bank
and the two officials alleging violations of Rule 10b-5. The trial
court found the defendants liable because (1) they misrepresented
the fair market price of the shares and (2) they had not disclosed
that they were making a market4 in the stock. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed
that the officials had violated Rule 10b-5 by falsely representing to
the plaintiffs that the price offered for purchase of the shares was
the prevailing market price, 3 but absolved the defendants as to the
allegation that the lack of disclosure of the bank's market making in
the shares violated any duties owed to the plaintiffs. The court so
held because the plaintiffs were unable to show any statement made
by the officials upon which they had relied."
36. Affiliate Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), aff'g 431 F.2d 1349 (10th
Cir. 1970), and aff'g in part & rev'g in part Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir.
1970). The Supreme Court's opinion will be referred to as Affiliated Ute.
37. Actually, the case involved more than this, but it is the Court's treatment of these
two defendants that is of concern here. The Court's discussion of the facts is set out in 406
U.S. at 144-49. For a general discussion of the case, see Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule lOb-5, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 119. The term
"mixed-blood" is statutory, see note 38 infra, and is used here to be consistent with the
statute and the Court's opinion. See 406 U.S. at 133 n.3.
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-77aa (1976).
39. 406 U.S. at 134.
40. Id. at 146, 152.
41. A market maker is defined by SEC Rule 17a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9 (1978), as a
dealer who holds himself out as being willing to buy and sell a particular stock for his own
account.
42. 406 U.S. at 146-48. The trial court's opinion is not reported. However, its findings are
set out in the Supreme Court's opinion in 406 U.S. at 145-49.
43. 431 F.2d at 1348.
44. Id.
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On review, the Supreme Court agreed that the false statements
as to the price of the shares were misstatements of a material fact
and thus violated clause two of Rule 10b-5.11 But more importantly,
the Court held that, by not informing the plaintiffs that the bank
was a market maker in the shares, the officials had violated the
rule's prohibition against nondisclosure."
Such a prohibition, the Court held, is not found under clause two
of the Rule, but rather under the first or third clause."7 "To be sure,
the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an
untrue statement of a material fact. The first and third paragraphs
are not so restricted."" The making of a market in a stock was a fact
that a reasonable investor might consider important and such activ-
ity on the part of the buyer could influence a decision whether to
sell shares. Thus, such information was material." "This being so,
[the defendants] possessed the affirmative duty under the Rule to
disclose this fact ... to the sellers."50 Plaintiffs' failure to show a
statement by the defendants upon which they relied was not an
obstacle to recovery for:5'
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to dis-
close, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in the making of this deci-
sion .... This obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact
establish the requisite element of causation in fact.
The last sentence quoted is critical. In support of this statement the
Court cited a circuit court opinion, Chasins v. Smith, Barney &
Co. 52
Chasins offered a similar fact pattern to Affiliated Ute. Again, a
dealer in securities failed to disclose to a customer the fact that the
dealer was a market maker in the security." The court stressed the
45. 406 U.S. at 152.
46. Id. at 152-53.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 406 U.S. at 152-53. The Supreme Court has refined the test of materiality from "might
have considered" to "would have assumed actual significance." TSC Indus., Inc. v. North-
way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
50. 406 U.S. at 153.
51. Id. at 152-53.
52. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
53. Id. at 1169.
1979]
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relationship between the parties. The plaintiff was the commentator
on a radio program sponsored by the defendant,54 and because of
this relationship the plaintiff was sure to rely on information from
the defendants.55
Affiliated Ute, therefore, can be seen as standing for the proposi-
tion that in nondisclosure cases, properly brought under clause one
or three of Rule 10b-5, reliance will be presumed," once an obliga-
tion to disclose, and the nondisclosure of a material fact are shown. 7
B. The Nature of the Duty: The "Under the Circumstances of
this Case" Requirement
The Court in Affiliated Ute began its holding on the causation
issue with the phrase: "Under the circumstances of this case
. ., At least three facts in the case can be seen as important
"circumstances." First, the bank officials and the plaintiffs were
engaged in face-to-face transactions." Second, the plaintiffs could
be characterized as unsophisticated investors. 0 Finally, there ex-
isted a relationship between the plaintiffs and the bank officials
such that the plaintiffs believed the bank officials were acting in
their behalf.61 As the first and second criteria were probably neces-
54. Id. at 1169, 1172.
55. Id. at 1172; see also Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving
Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 435, 454 (1977). In fact, the
court appeared to be more concerned with plaintiff's role as radio commentator than it was
with defendants' violation of SEC Rule 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1978). The rule
requires disclosure to the customer of the broker's market maker status. "Market maker" is
defined in note 41 supra.
56. The effect of the presumption, e.g., is it rebuttable, shall not be discussed here. See
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARv. L. REv.
584, 597-601 (1975).
57. Accord, Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 325 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524
F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975). See also 3 Loss, supra note 36, at 1766. " '[T]he duty to speak
which is implicit in Rule (10b-5) arises in those circumstances where a fiduciary or quasi-
fiduciary relation exists, where confidence is reposed or influence acquired, where there is a
justifiable expectancy of disclosure or reliance upon the superior knowledge of an-
other . I..' Id. (quoting Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D. Ohio 1959)).
58. 406 U.S. at 153. One of the petitioners in Affiliated Ute urged the Court to eliminate
reliance in.all Rule lOb-5 cases. By beginning its holding as it did, the Court apparently
rejected the argument. See Note, The Nature and Scope of Reliance in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule lob-5, 24 CASE WEST. L. REV. 363, 385 n.122 (1973).
59. 431 F.2d at 1348.
60. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584, 586 (1975).
61. 406 U.S. at 152-53.
NOTES
sary to reach the third, it is the critical element. Further, at least
one court has rejected the face-to-face requirement.2 Therefore, the
initial inquiry for a court faced with a complaint that alleges fraud
by nondisclosure is what "duty of disclosure the law should impose
upon the person being sued." 3
For a duty to be found, a special relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant-nondiscloser must exist." For example, if an
individual were about to make a sizeable sale, in a thinly traded
stock, which would affect the price of the stock, he need not make
his intention to sell public, 5 for there exists no special relation be-
tween such seller and the public.6
1. Broker-Dealers
As between brokers and their clients, however, a duty exists, at
least if the broker is aware of inside information regarding the com-
pany; 7 if the broker is aware that a large purchase or sale is about
to be transacted; or, if the broker is buying for his own account
before recommending the stock to his clients.6
Although courts rarely speak in terms of agency law when consid-
ering these questions, the situation where the client is buying a
stock in which the brokerage house is a market maker can be ana-
lyzed in those terms. The broker is acting as an agent of the client
when he purchases the stock and a principal when he sells from the
brokerage house's account. When an individual acts as an agent
he is obligated to act just for the one principal or disclose precisely
62. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 240 (2d Cir.
1974).
63. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
64. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 106, at 696; 3 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Toars § 551
(1977) (both concerning tort law).
65. See Fleischer, Munheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 798, 804 (1973).
66. If, however, the person were to acquire five per cent or more of the outstanding shares
of a company there is a duty to disclose imposed by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)
(1976). The purpose of disclosure under the Williams Act is different than that under Rule
10b-5. Indeed, disclosure under the Williams Act must be made only after the purchase. Id.
67. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 278
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), affl'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
68. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); see also note 30
supra.
69. 3 Loss, supra note 16, at 1501-02; see also cases cited therein, especially Arleen W.
Hayes, 27 S.E.C. 629 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
what his role is. 0 The principal-agent relation is, axiomatically, a
fiduciary relation.7'
In the situations where the broker is not a market maker, the
obligation to disclose will usually not arise if the broker is merely
executing a sale or purchase at the direction of the client. Rather,
it will arise in cases in which: (1) the client has vested the broker
with discretion to make substantial investment decisions, thus act-
ing as an agent;"2 or (2) where, for other reasons, there exists a trust
relation between broker and client giving the client reason to rely
on the actions of the broker. Seemingly innocuous circumstances
may give rise to this trust relationship. A duty to disclose has been
found where a broker's client was a radio announcer on a program
sponsored by the broker's firm.73
2. Common-law Fiduciary Relations
The common law imposes a duty upon those in a fiduciary rela-
tion to disclose material information.7" While finding such a relation
could easily create a situation for nondisclosure, the Supreme Court
has limited this approach by holding that there is no Rule 10b-5
liability for breach of a fiduciary duty, absent a showing of decep-
tion.75 If this showing could be met, a fiduciary relationship presum-
ably would qualify as a "circumstance" effective for requiring dis-
closure under the Rule.
3. Agreements to Purchase or Sell Stock
Stock buy-back arrangements have caused a plethora of litiga-
tion, probably because the seller later believes (correctly or incor-
rectly) that the purchaser would not have exercised the buy-back
option if it was not advantageous. Although the agreement itself
may explicitly place a duty to disclose upon the parties," even ab-
70. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 150 (1964).
71. W. SELL, AGENCY § 2 (1975) (citing Hobson v. Easton, 399 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1968)); 1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
72. See note 69 supra.
73. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). See also notes 54 & 55
supra.
74, PROSSER, supra note 6, § 106, at 697.
75. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See generally Note, Suits for
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule lOb-5 After Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 1874 (1978).
76. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1975).
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sent such a provision a duty has been found. The cases often turn
on the materiality of the purchaser's information."
In one case, 8 for example, a close corporation exercised a stock
buy-back option from the estate of a deceased shareholder. Al-
though the corporation was in negotiations to be taken over, which
would presumably increase the price of its stock, this fact was not
disclosed to the estate. 9 The estate brought suit against the corpora-
tion under Rule 10b-5, alleging nondisclosure.
In reversing a finding of liability, the appellate court explained
that because the price at which the stock was to be bought back was
fixed by a formula in the corporation charter, the take-over negotia-
tions were not material. 0 However, in dicta, the court stated that
there was a duty to disclose, but the duty was not violated because
the information was not material.8 '
The implication to sales or purchases not governed by an agree-
ment is clear. While formal tender offers, for example, are regulated
by their own set of rules which require the disclosure of material
information, '2 certain private transactions are not so constricted.
While one court has said that it is unnecessary for a potential pur-
chaser to disclose information that would be against his own busi-
ness interests,8 3 the majority of courts require the disclosure if the
information is material. 4
V. Affiliated Ute's Progeny
The lower courts have not applied Affiliated Ute uniformly. That
a confusion exists is understandable as a result of the surface simi-
larity in the words "omission" and "nondisclosure." At least three
77. See notes 79-84 infra and accompanying text.
78. Toledo Trust Co. v. Nye, 588 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978).
79. Id. at 205.
80. Id. at 206-07.
81. Id. at 207 n.21. But see Villada v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
460 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (information was material but court held no liability for
nondisclosure); St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
82. Section 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
by the Williams Act, is a broad anti-fraud provision.
83. Villada v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1149, 1150
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
84. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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interpretations can be seen. The first group of cases either do not
see a distinction between omission and nondisclosure and presume
reliance in both, or acknowledge a distinction but hold that
Affiliated Ute applies to both.85 The second group makes a distinc-
tion between omission and nondisclosure and holds that the pre-
sumption should only be made in the latter case."6 Finally, a few
courts have held that the presumption is to be made in all Rule 10b-
5 cases. 7 As this last view is in a distinct minority it shall not be
considered further.
A. Omissions or Nondisclosures Presume Reliance
The application of Affiliated Ute to situations where fraud by
omision is alleged can be seen in the Fifth Circuit's directive to a
district court.
If the court determines that [the case before it] is a misrepresentation case,
the more stringent reliance requirement would apply, and [the plaintiff]
would have to prove he relied upon the defendants' misrepresentations. If,
on the other hand, the district court determines that [it] is an omissions
case, [the plaintiff] would be entitled to the Ute presumption of reli-
ance .... a
That the Fifth Circuit was speaking of omissions as that term has
been defined here is clear: the omissions in the case occurred in the
context of a company's financial statements. 9 Problematically, the
court also refers to the omissions as "misstatements."'90
85. See, e.g., Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978); Rifkin v. Crow, 574
F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (dictum); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1977); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1976); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d
880, 884 (5th Cir. 1973); Frankel v. Wylie & Thornhill, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 330 (W.D. Va. 1972).
See also 5 H. NEWBERO, CLAss ACTIONS § 8824b, at 883 (1977) (Affiliated Ute virtually elimi-
nates any requirement for proof of individual reliance in class actions).
86. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978);
Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 127 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd on this point, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Cutner v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 12
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also note 57 supra.
87. See, e.g., Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975) Affiliated Ute applies
to cases of misrepresentation or nondisclosure); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., 79 F.R.D. 246,
261-62 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (misrepresentations). For earlier cases, see those cited in Note, The
Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARv. L. REv. 584, 588
n.22 (1975).
88. Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978).
89. Id. at 258.
90. Id. at 263. The court's use of the term probably was inadvertent. Or was it? It can be
argued that the fraud alleged really was one of misstatement or misrepresentation. The Ninth
Circuit interchanged words in a similar context. See note 108 infra and accompanying text.
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In support of its interpretation of Affiliated Ute the First Circuit
relied, inter alia, upon a Ninth Circuit case." The case may be
regarded as the leading exponent of the view that Affiliated Ute is
applicable to omissions. It is worthwhile to examine this case in
some detail and then to contrast it with two other cases which come
to a different result.2 Finally, the underlying rationale of these three
opinions will be examined. 3
In the Ninth Circuit case, Blackie v. Barrack,"4 a class action was
instituted against a company, its officers and directors, and the
company's independent auditors," on behalf of all those who pur-
chased the company's stock during a certain period. The complaint
alleged that the purchasers were defrauded because the stock's price
was artifically inflated." This inflation was allegedly due to false
statements in the company's annual and interim reports, press re-
leases, and SEC filings. 7 Upon motion, class certification was
granted by the district court. 8 Some of the defendants appealed,
arguing in part, that individual questions of reliance by members
of the class, precluded class treatment.
The Ninth Circuit held that proof of "subjective"reliancelm was
unnecessary where a plaintiff's claims "are, or can be, cast in omis-
sin or non-disclosure terms. . ... "0" For support, the court cited
Affiliated Ute.' 2 Stating what is called a "fraud on the market"
theory, the court explained that in situations involving widely
traded stocks, once materiality is shown, causation is shown "more
91. Id. at 263 n.4 (citing Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976)). Blackie is discussed immediately infra.
92. See pt. V(A) infra.
93. See pt. VI infra.
94. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
95. 524 F.2d at 894.
96. Id. at 902.
97. Id. (quoting the complaint).
98. Pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 23. The court's discussion of certification is set out in 524
F.2d at 900-11.
99. Id. at 905.
100. "Subjective reliance" is the court's term for individual reliance. 524 F.2d at 905. See
also note 111 infra. It is probably derived from what has come to be called the subjec-
tive/objective distinction in causation. Subjective causation is shown when it is demonstrated
that the plaintiff relied on the acts or omissions of the defendant. Objective causation is
shown once materiality has been demonstrated. See H. BLoOMENTHAL, SECURIES AND FED-
ERAL COMRORATE LAw § 9.21 (rev. ed. 1977).
101. 524 F.2d at 905.
102. Id.
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likely than not ..... ,,0 Reliance is eliminated from the formulation
for, given materiality, some traders in the market must have relied
on the company's false reports, thus causing the stock's price to rise
artificially 04 In the situation before it, the court stated that requir-
ing proof of reliance "directly. .. impose[d] an unreasonable and
irrelevant evidentiary burden"'' 5 on the pllaintiffs. Thus, class certi-
fication was proper, and the case was remanded for trial.'0 6
There are two analytical difficulties with Blackie. First, as was
developed earlier,' 7 Affiliated Ute's presumption of reliance is not
properly invoked when the fraud alleged is one of omission rather
than nondisclosure. Second, even assuming Affiliated Ute is applic-
able to omission, the facts as presented by the court do not indicate
that the defendants were guilty of omission or nondisclosure, but
rather misrepresentation. In fact, the court itself used that term at
one point.' 5
Nothing, so far as is discernible from the court's recitation of the
facts, was left out of any of the company's written reports. Instead,
the defendants were alleged to have misrepresented the true finan-
cial picture of the company,'0 by: overstating earnings, inventories,
and other assets; "burying" certain expense items; failing to write-
off certain assets; failing to establish adequate reserves for receiva-
bles; and, misrepresenting the company's prospects for future earn-
ings."'0 If the complaint is to be believed nothing was omitted, save
the truth."'
103. Id. at 906 n.22.
104. Id. at 904.
105. Id. at 907.
106. Unfortunately the case never did go to trial. Unfortunate, because it would have been
interesting to see how the trial court would have dealt with the individual issues of reliance
in terms of awarding damages. The Ninth Circuit felt this would be "virtually a mechanical
task." 524 F.2d at 905.
While a writ of certiorari was being sought, most of the parties entered into a provisional
settlement agreement which required the defendants to pay approximately $7.75 million.
Supplemental Brief of Petitioners at 3, Blackie v. Barrack, 429 U.S. 816 (1977) (No. 75-1258)
(denying certiorari), reprinted in 1A SECURITIES CASES DENIED CERTIORARI (Securities Regula-
tion Series) at 27 (1976/1977). After denial of the writ the agreement presumably went into
effect.
107. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
108. 524 F.2d at 894.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 902.
111. A more recent panel in the Ninth Circuit had more of a problem with reliance than
did the Blackie panel. Little v. First Cal. Co., 532 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1976). The court was
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Moreover, nowhere did the court make an inquiry into the exist-
ence of any duty to disclose. There was no showing of a special
relationship, the "under the circumstances of this case,"" 2 that the
Court found in Affiliated Ute. The Eighth Circuit, in considering a
similar factual situation to Blackie, reached a decidedly different
result.
B. Only Nondisclosures Presume Reliance
In Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co.,"13 a hospital revenue bond
purchaser, attempting to represent all the purchasers of the bonds,
brought suit against those associated with the offering and one of
the brokerage houses from whom he purchased. Plaintiff alleged
that the offering statements covering the bonds were fraudulent.",
On motion for summary judgment, defendants demonstrated that
the plaintiff had not received the offering statement prior to pur-
chasing the bonds."' Thus, they argued, plaintiff could not have
relied on any statements made therein. The trial court agreed and
granted defendants' motion."'
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiff-appellant, relying
in part on Blackie v. Barrack,"7 argued that his complaint alleged
fraud by omission, misstatement, and nondisclosure, and therefore
Affiliated Ute's presumption of reliance should be applied."' Specif-
ically, he alleged that the offering statement did not state, inter
alia, (1) the speculative and risky nature of the bonds, and (2) an
accurate financial picture of the hospital authority,"' and claimed
tliat such a withholding of information was a nondisclosure within
faced with an alleged fraud involving the sale of subordinated capital notes. It was alleged
that certain information was not disclosed to the purchasers. Such a sale, the court held,
could not fit within Blackie's "fraud on the market" theory. Id. at 1304 n.3. The court
explained that because the defendants had made some general representations proof of
"individual" reliance should be required. Id. at 1304 n.4. This presented a "dilemma" for it
might be found that the plaintiffs' who had relied would not have a sufficient stake in the
matter to prosecute their claims; but to obviate proof of reliance might fdrce defendants to
compensate plaintiffs who had not relied. Id. The court did not resolve the dilemma.
112. 406 U.S. at 152-53. See also notes 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
113. 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
114. Id. at 717.
115. Id. at 718, 720.
116. Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., No. 76-0-423 (D. Neb. Aug. 29, 1977).
117. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
118. Brief for Appellant at 25, 26 & Reply Brief for Appellant at 9, 10, Vervaecke v. Chiles,
Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
119. Brief for Appellant, supra note 118, at 8.
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the meaning of Affiliated Ute.'2 0
The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument saying the thrust of the
complaint was fraud by way of material misrepresentations and
omissions.' The court explained that "misrepresentations, and
omissions in the nature of misrepresentations (misleading state-
ments, half truths), are appropriately considered alike in this case
under 10b-5(2)." 1'2 As Affiliated Ute spoke to situations of nondis-
closure, it was not applicable to the case at bar.z Therefore, the
defendants' demonstration of a lack of reliance was sufficient to
carry a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court's ruling
was affirmed.'24
Upon this finding, the Eighth Circuit held that the district court's
refusal to certify a class action was also proper, as the plaintiff,
subject to the unique defense of a lack of reliance, would be an
inadequate class plaintiff.'25 The thrust of Vervaecke becomes even
clearer if the analysis of an earlier district court case is examined.'
In Herzfeld, the action, again, was based upon allegedly mislead-
ing financial statements reported on by independent auditors.",
The district court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the com-
plaint alleged nondisclosure suitable for a presumption of reli-
ance: "I
It is of no moment that the misrepresentation in part resulted from failure
to disclose material facts. We think the case no different from an accoun-
tant's false report of a company's earnings, a clear case of misrepresntation,
because, in either case, the accountant makes representations which he
knows are untrue. [Affiliated UteI, therefore, which was grounded on a mere
nondisclosure unaccompanied by any representation whatever, is inappos-
ite.
This statement is similar to the Eighth Circuit's observation in
Vervaecke, of "omissions in the nature of misrepresen-
tations . ... ',2
120. Id. at 24.
121. 578 F.2d at 717.
122. Id. at 718 n.4.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 720.
125. Id.
126. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
127. 378 F. Supp. at 117.
128. Id. at 127.
129. 578 F.2d at 717 n.2; see also notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
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VI. Conclusion
Thus, a distinction can be seen between omission and nondisclo-
sure. Under the proper circumstances, 3 ' in the case of nondisclo-
sure, a presumption of reliance should be made. To presume reli-
ance in those situations is compelling, and furthers the purpose of
the Rule, for, as a practical (or logical) matter, in the case of nondis-
closure, it would be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to demon-
strate reliance when nothing was said. 3'
In contradistinction, the presumption is properly not afforded
when the complaint alleges a material omission. In this situation a
defrauded plaintiff should be able to come forward with a docu-
ment, 32 or evidence of a conversation, and establish that something,
but not all, was said. Moreover, to relieve the plaintiff of a showing
of reliance in omission situations might allow recovery further than
policy dictates. As is often said, Rule 10b-5 is meant to deter fraud
not provide insurance for every purchaser of securities. 33 People
purchase and sell securities for a myriad of reasons, only one of
which may be the inspection and analysis of documents issued by
the offering company. To allow recovery to a plaintiff who never
read the document, much less relied upon it, eliminates the causal
nexus between the act of the defendant and the harm suffered by
the plaintiff. '3'
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Blackie v. Barrack,'35 essentially
eliminated the reliance requirement in class actions under the
Rule.' 3' As was developed above, 37 the court should not have relied
upon Affiliated Ute in so doing. Additionally, other authority relied
upon by the court can be seen as weak.3 8 If the Ninth Circuit's
130. See pt. IV(B) supra.
131. 2 BROMBERG, supra note 16, § 8.6(1), at 209.
.132. E.g., an annual report, a private placement memorandum, or one of the various
periodic financial statements required by the SEC.
133. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.) (aim of Rule is to
qualify doctrine of caveat emptor, not establish scheme of investor's insurance), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
134. See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977) (without proof of causation defendant could be liable to
all the world), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
135. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
136. 5 H. NEWBERG, CLASs ACTIONS § 8824b, at 883 (1977).
137. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
138. For instance, aside from the interpretation of Affiliated Ute, the court quoted from
the Advisory Committee's Note on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 thus: "(A] fraud
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decision is seen as making new law based upon policy considera-
tions, the policy has been embraced by some,'39 and rejected by
others. 40
The better view is that Affiliated Ute is only applicable to cases
of total nondisclosure. Not only is this view consistent with the facts
of Affiliated Ute, but it is in harmony with the current philosophy
of the Supreme Court to contain development in the area of the
securities laws in general"' and Rule 10b-5 in particular.'
George 0. Richardson, III
perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appeal-
ing situation for a class action. ... 524 F.2d at 903. However, the court did not quote the
next sentence of the Note which states: "On the other hand, although having some common
core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material
variation in the misrepresentations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons
to whom they were addressed." Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 103 (1966).
139. See, e.g., Rifkind v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Stoll, Reliance
as an Element in Iob-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169,179-82 (1974). Mr. Stoll formulates three
categories where reliance will be presumed, viz.: (1) nondisclosure actions, (2) affirmative
misrepresentation cases if brought as class actions, and (3) tender-offers, shortform mergers,
or manipulated market prices. Id. at 181.
140. See, e.g., Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). There the court stated
as to Blachie's presumption in class actions: "This seems to us an untenable position. A class
of valid claims cannot be created by aggregating a host of invalid ones." Id. at 289 n.7. Accord,
Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60 (W.D. Pa. 1976), appeal dismissed, 556
F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977). The district court denied class certification and declined to distin-
guish Blackie, stating: "[As to the] Ninth Circuit's preference for a different result, I simply
and respectfully disagree." Id. at 65 n.4.
141. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (denying standing to
defeated tender offeror to sue for money damages); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426
U.S. 449 (1976) (redefining materiality); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421
U.S. 412 (1975) (declining to imply private action under the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970).
142. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring scienter in
private damage action under Rule lOb-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 423 (1975).
